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THE ROLE OF SPOTLIGHTING PROCEDURES
IN PROMOTING CITIZEN PARTICIPATION,
TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY

David Markell*

Theories abound as to how we should organize ourselves to deal
effectively with contemporary governance challenges.! There is a
great deal of interest in "new governance" and other similar
approaches, which tout the benefits of increasing citizen
participation and government transparency and accountability. 2 As
one scholar colorfully puts it, today there is "nearly universal
veneration of open government as a political idea," making
transparency "the sweet elixir of contemporary governance."
President Obama's rhetoric certainly embraces these objectives. As
a candidate, Obama supported "creat[ing] a new level of
* Steven M. Goldstein Professor, Florida State University College of Law.
Thanks to Professors John Knox, J.B. Ruhl, and Chris Wold for their helpful
comments on earlier drafts of this Article. Lauren Morrissette, J.D. Candidate,
Florida State University, College of Law, May 2011, provided excellent research
assistance. My assistant Rebecca Marsey did a terrific job creating the charts
and figures in the Article and compiling the underlying data. I also want to
thank the Wake Forest Law Review editors for their careful work reviewing the
accuracy of the underlying data and the charts and figures used in the Article.
1. For a thoughtful discussion of contemporary governance challenges and
some of the theoretical literature and practical approaches that have emerged
to address them, see J.B. Ruhl & James Salzman, Massive Problems in the
Administrative State: Strategiesfor Whittling Away, 98 CAL. L. REv. 59 (2010).
2. See Neil Gunningham, The New Collaborative Environmental
Governance: The Localization of Regulation, 36 J.L.S. 145, 146, 150 (2009)

(U.K.) (suggesting that "the term ["new governance"] is defined more by what it
is not, than by what it is," but noting nonetheless that common features include
a commitment to transparency, a greater role for nonstate actors, and a "softlaw" orientation).
3. Cary Coglianese,
The Transparency President? The Obama
Administration and Open Government, 22 GOVERNANCE 529, 530 (2009)

(describing contemporary enthusiasm about citizen participation and open and
accountable government). But see JOHN R. HIBBING & ELIZABETH THEISS-MORSE,
STEALTH DEMOCRACY: AMERICANS' BELIEFS ABOUT How GOVERNMENT SHOULD
WORK 1-2, 7 (2002) (arguing based on their empirical results that citizens do

not want to participate actively in governance in many circumstances and that,
instead, what is most important to them is that political decision makers be
neutral).
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transparency, accountability and participation for America's
citizens."4 On his first day in office, he signed a series of memos
extolling and embracing the themes of citizen participation and
government transparency and accountability.
This Article examines an innovative governance mechanismthe North American Commission for Environmental Cooperation
("CEC") citizen submissions process-which incorporates "new
governance"-type features that many theorists believe will assist in
the effort to "break the logjam" in environmental policy and
implementation. 6 The process expands opportunities for public
involvement in governance by creating a new mechanism that
citizens may use to raise concerns about the effectiveness of
government enforcement policies and practices. It operates as a
"soft-law," "spotlighting" instrument that is intended to enhance
government accountability and transparency. Thus, lessons gleaned
from studying this process can potentially inform discussions about
central features of governance, including the appropriate roles for
different actors and instrument choice.' In short, the successes and
4. Coglianese, supra note 3, at 553.
5. See, e.g., Memorandum on Freedom of Information Act, Jan. 21, 2009,
74 Fed. Reg. 4683 (Jan. 26, 2009). Additionally, the White House issued an

"Open

Government

Directive"

to

promote

government

transparency,

participation, and collaboration. See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir.,
Office of Mgmt. & Budget, to Heads of Executive Dep'ts & Agencies (Dec. 8,
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/assets/memoranda2010
/ml0-06.pdf. The Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") has echoed the
President's call for greater transparency and citizen participation and taken
several steps to work toward these goals. See, e.g., Memorandum from Lisa
Jackson, Administrator, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to EPA Employees (Jan. 23, 2009),
http://www.epa.gov/Administrator/memotoemployees.html
at
available
[hereinafter EPA Memo] (discussing transparency in the EPA's operations).
6. See Symposium, Breaking the Logjam: Environmental Reform for the

New Congress and Administration, 17 N.Y.U. ENvTL. L.J. 1 (2008) (identifying
guiding principles for environmental-law reform, including the adoption of new
information tools to assist in the regulatory scheme). The United States,
Canada, and Mexico established the citizen submissions process in the North
North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation ("NAAEC").
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., arts. 1415, Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1480 [hereinafter NAAEC]. This agreement is
commonly referred to as the "environmental side agreement" to the North
American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA"). See, e.g., Chris Wold, Evaluating
NAFTA and the Commission for Environmental Cooperation: Lessons for
Integrating Trade and Environment in Free Trade Agreements, 28 ST. Louis U.

PuB. L. REV. 201, 203 (2008). NAFTA, the NAAEC, and a labor side agreement,

the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation ("NAALC"), went into

effect simultaneously in the early 1990s. See NAAEC, supra; North American
Agreement on Labor Cooperation, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Sept. 14, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
1499; North American Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Can.-Mex., Dec. 17, 1992,
32 I.L.M. 289 & 605 (1993).
7. For recent commentary addressing the appropriate roles of different
actors and instrument choice in regulatory schemes, see David E. Adelman &
Kristen H. Engel, Adaptive Federalism: The Case Against Reallocating
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challenges8 of the process should be of special interest to those
interested in governance mechanisms intended to advance
government transparency and accountability and opportunities for
citizen involvement.
The CEC process also deserves careful study because, as a
practical matter, the procedure "continues to be a model" for U.S.
regional trade agreements."o Thus, insights from the experience
with the procedure promise to contribute to "on the ground"
formulation of policy and process design.
In addition, some sophisticated observers have characterized
the process as "very popular" with environmental advocates and
Study of the process therefore would seem
citizen groups."
particularly likely to yield important insights about what works, in
addition to lessons about ways to improve.
As a former Director of the CEC citizen submissions process,12 1
would be pleased to be able to laud the process as an innovative
"reasoned
participation,
citizen
enhance
to
experiment
transparency," and accountability in the operation of government,
especially since many observers have hailed the process as the most
important feature of the CEC and as a model for other agreements.
EnvironmentalRegulatory Authority, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1796 (2008) (discussing
"adaptive federalism"), and Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation
and the Rise of Governance in ContemporaryLegal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV.

432 (2004) (focusing on "new governance").
8. See Coglianese, supra note 3, at 536 (recognizing that "too much"
transparency could detract from an official's ability to make good decisions and
diminish the likelihood that private actors would divulge useful information to
government officials).
9. See id. at 537 (contrasting "reasoned transparency" in which
"government officials offer explicit explanations for their actions," with
"fishbowl transparency," which seeks to "expand the release of information that
can document how government officials actually behave"). Professor Coglianese
touts the promise of "reasoned transparency" approaches for their potential to
improve governance by encouraging officials to explain their actions. Id.
10. See Sanford E. Gaines, Environmental Protection in Regional Trade
Agreements: Realizing Potential, 28 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REV. 253, 268 (2008);

see also Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation [CEC], Ten-Year Review & Assessment
Comm., Ten Years of North American Environmental Cooperation, at 4 (June

2004), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF/ABOUTUS/TRAC
15,
-Report2004 en.pdf [hereinafter CEC, Ten Years] (noting that the citizen
submissions provisions, among others, make the CEC an "international model
for providing new avenues of public participation for civil society").
11. See Gaines, supra note 10, at 269.
12. I served in that capacity from 1998-2000. The CEC Secretariat
received citizen submissions well before 1998, with the first filed in 1995, but
the Secretariat first created a discrete unit to focus on these submissions and
appointed a Director to head that unit in 1998.
13. See CEC, Ten Years, supra note 10, at 43 (citing various advocates
highlighting the importance of the citizen submissions process); Kal Raustiala,
Police Patrols & Fire Alarms in the NAAEC, 26 LoY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
389, 395 (2004) (arguing that the submissions process was the NAAEC's

428

WAKE FOREST LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

But while I think the process has produced some successes," I am
not so sanguine about the process-particularly its track record (or
reception) to date; its prospects for the future (unless adjustments
are made of the type I discuss below); or its value as a model for
other citizen-driven "reasoned transparency" and accountability
processes.15 In part, this Article is intended as a cautionary note
about challenges in creating new governance structures that
empower citizens and make government more transparent and
accountable. I also offer specific "fixes" to strengthen the CEC
process in the short term as well as a conceptual framework for
reconsidering the appropriate focus and structure of citizen
submissions processes to enhance their effectiveness. My hope is
that this relatively in-depth review of the CEC experience, in
tandem with my specific fixes and proposed conceptual framework,
will advance discourse about central issues concerning the role for
citizens in government, government transparency, and government
accountability.
Part I provides a brief overview of the CEC and its governing
Agreement, the North American Agreement on Environmental
It describes the purposes and the
Cooperation ("NAAEC").16
structure of the citizen submissions process and identifies some of
the mechanism's features that I believe make it potentially
Part II provides an empirically based
attractive for citizens.
assessment of the track record of the citizen submissions process to
date and summarizes why the process has not realized its promise.

"centerpiece"); Wold, supra note 6, at 227 ("The citizen submission process, in
many ways, was the centerpiece of NAAEC.").
14. For example, it seems clear that the process has produced helpful
results in some situations. See CEC, Joint Pub. Advisory Comm., Lessons
Learned: Citizen Submissions Under Articles 14 and 15 of the North American
Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 5-9 (June 6, 2001), available at

[hereinafter
http://www.cec.org/files/pdf/ABOUTUS/repl1-e-finalEN.PDF
CEC, Lessons Learned] (describing the value added by the first two factual
records); Randy Christensen, The Citizen Submission Process Under NAFTA:
Observations After 10 Years, 14 J. ENVTL. L. & PRAc. 165, 165 (2004) (Can.)

(recognizing that the citizen submissions process has been successful in
highlighting environmental problems, provoking governmental debate about
environmental enforcement, and ushering change through independent factual
investigations).
15. Despite my concerns, I believe that the process still has potential, both
in its own right and as a model, although I expressed a greater sense of
optimism in an earlier piece. See David L. Markell, The Citizen Spotlight
Process, 18 ENVTL. F. 32, 32 (2001). Some other commentators share my
skepticism about the future success of the process. See Geoff Garver, Tooth
Decay, 25 ENVTL. F. 34, 34; Wold, supra note 6, at 228-33.
16. I include a very brief overview of the NAAEC and the citizen
submissions process to provide context for the rest of this Article. For a more
in-depth treatment, see GREENING NAFTA: THE NORTH AMERICAN COMMISSION
FOR ENVIRONMENTAL COOPERATION (David L. Markell & John H. Knox eds.,
2003) [hereinafter GREENING NAFTA].
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Part III contains my effort to contribute some constructive
commentary about options for improving the present CEC citizen
submissions process. In this Part, I also propose a conceptual
framework for revamping citizen submissions processes to make
them more attractive and effective.
I. THE NAAEC's PURPOSES AND THE GOALS, PROMISE, AND
STRUCTURE OF ITS CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS

One of the primary purposes of the NAAEC and the institution
it created-the CEC-was to ameliorate concerns that enhanced
trade under the North American Free Trade Agreement ("NAFTA")
would adversely affect the North American environment.17 But the
objectives outlined in the NAAEC extend far beyond mitigating
adverse environmental effects associated with trade. For example,
the first objective listed in the NAAEC is extraordinarily farreaching-to "foster the protection and improvement of the
environment in the [three member countriesl for the well-being of
present and future generations."' 8 To further this objective, the
NAAEC empowers the CEC Council (the institution's governing
body, comprised of the environmental ministers for the three
9
countries) to address such "matters as it may decide."' Thus, the
NAAEC grants the Council the power to consider "virtually any
environmental issue" affecting North America.20
Promoting civic engagement in order to enhance environmental
2
protection was an overarching objective of the NAAEC's drafters. '
The Agreement is replete with references to the value of citizen
participation.2 2 Further, it includes several innovative mechanisms
intended to facilitate such participation both regionally and
The CEC citizen submissions process, which
domestically.
17. See John H. Knox, A New Approach to Compliance with International
Environmental Law: The Submissions Procedureof the NAFTA Environmental
Commission, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 53-54 (2001).
18. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 1(a); accord John H. Knox & David L.
Markell, The Innovative North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 16, at 1, 10-11 (noting the broad

scope of NAAEC). In adopting such a broad objective, the NAFTA parties were
careful to note that each member state ultimately retains the right to establish
its own "levels of domestic environmental protection and environmental
development policies and priorities." NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 3.
19. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 10, para. 2. The three key actors in the CEC
are the Council, the Secretariat, and the Joint Public Advisory Committee

("JPAC"). See David L. Markell, Understanding Citizen Perspectives on
Government Decision Making Processes as a Way to Improve the Administrative
State, 36 ENVTL. L. 651, 659-60 (2006) (discussing these actors).
20. Knox & Markell, supra note 18, at 11.

21. See CEC, Ten Years, supra note 10, at 4 (suggesting that the NAAEC
"stands out for its provisions for public participation").
22.

See NAAEC, supra note 6, pmbl., art. 1(h).

23. See id. arts. 4, 6-7, 14, 16-17.
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empowers a citizen of any of the three member countries to file a
complaint alleging that one of the three countries is failing to
effectively enforce its environmental laws,24 is only one of several
innovative features intended to promote citizen participation.
Several observers have characterized the CEC citizen submissions
process as the most important type of citizen participation promoted
by the NAAEC. 26 Indeed, as noted above, many commentators have
27
called the process the centerpiece of the entire agreement.
The NAAEC countries agreed that the CEC citizen submissions
process would focus on domestic enforcement, specifically on
"failures to effectively enforce environmental laws," rather than on
The
the adequacy of the environmental laws themselves.
negotiators' view was that the legal regimes of the countries were
relatively strong (or at least relatively comparable); however, there
was a significant gap between the laws and their implementation
due to less-than-effective enforcement, especially in Mexico. 29 Asa
result, the hope was that attention generated by the CEC citizen
submissions process would motivate the parties to bolster their
domestic enforcement capacity and performance.
The citizen submissions process is an example of a "fire alarm"
mechanism in that citizens initiate the process through the filing of
When it receives a
a submission with the CEC Secretariat.o
24. Id. art. 14, para. 1.
25. Another very innovative public-participation mechanism involves the
creation of the JPAC as part of the institutional framework for the CEC to bring
citizens into the administration of the Agreement. See John D. Wirth,
Perspectives on the Joint Public Advisory Committee, in GREENING NAFTA,

supra note 16, at 199, 199.
26. See, e.g., Chris Wold et al., The Inadequacy of the Citizen Submission
Process of Articles 14 & 15 of the North American Agreement on Environmental

415, 416 (2004) ("The Citizen
most innovative and closelyagreement.").
43; ENVTL. LAW INST., FINAL
15 OF THE NORTH AMERICAN
COOPERATION V (2003), available at
AGREEMENT ON ENVIRONMENTAL
Markell, supra
http://www.unece.org/env/pp/ppiflELI%20CEC%20Report.pdf;
note 19, at 661-62; Wold, supra note 6, at 227.
28. See NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 14, para. 1.
29. See Knox, supra note 17, at 54, 81-82 (highlighting the negotiators'
concern about Mexico's enforcement of its environmental laws and the
Agreement's subsequent focus on enforcing existing environmental standards
rather than creating new ones); see also CEC, Indep. Review Comm., Four-Year
Cooperation, 26 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. L. REV.
Submission Process is widely regarded as the
watched aspect of the NAFTA environmental side
27. See CEC, Ten Years, supra note 10, at
REPORT: IssuEs RELATED TO ARTICLES 14 AND

Review of the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation, at 19

available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf//NAAEC-4-year
(June 1998),
-review-en.pdf [hereinafter CEC, Four-Year Review] (recognizing that the
agreement, in part, was adopted to address the "Mexican [enforcement]
problem").
30. See NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 14, para. 1. A "fire alarm" mechanism is
a mechanism that empowers citizens and interest groups to monitor
government compliance with various obligations and objectives. See Mathew D.
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submission, the Secretariat conducts an initial review based on the
factors listed in the NAAEC. 3 ' The Secretariat may dismiss a
submission if it is deficient or ask the targeted party to respond if
the submission meets the submission criteria.12
Following receipt of the party's response, the Secretariat decides
whether to recommend to the Council that a "factual record" be
developed to investigate the citizen's claims about ineffective
enforcement.
If the Secretariat so recommends, the Council may
agree and the Secretariat would then develop a draft factual
record."
On the other hand, the Council may reject the
recommendation; the Secretariat would then dismiss the
submission. When the Secretariat develops a draft factual record,
Secretariat
it is made available to the parties for comment." The
then finalizes the factual record and provides it to the Council,
which decides whether to release the factual record to the public."
As the preceding brief summary reflects, the citizen
submissions process is intended to serve as a regional spotlight on
domestic enforcement. By engaging citizens and using a "softer,"
approach, the procedure incorporates
transparency-oriented
features that are characteristic of "new governance" approaches.
One final contextual point about the citizen submissions process
relates to its likely appeal. Given citizen skepticism about the
39
enforcement of environmental laws in the United States, one
would expect citizens to be hopeful and enthusiastic about any new
mechanism intended to focus attention on deficient enforcement
practices. This seemingly would be particularly true for processes
that empower citizens to decide which government enforcement
practices deserve special scrutiny. In addition, the CEC citizen
submissions process incorporates several features that should make
it an attractive tool. For example, the process may be available
when others are not-citizens who cannot meet standing and other
threshold requirements for accessing the court system may use the
McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. Sc. 165, 166 (1984); see also Kal
Raustiala, Citizen Submissions and Treaty Review in the NAAEC, in GREENING
NAFTA, supra note 16, at 256, 258 ("Fire alarms are procedures that private
actors trigger to signal that a violation or problem has occurred.").
31. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 14, paras. 1-2.
32. Id. para. 2.
33. Id. art. 15, para. 1.
34. Id. para. 2.
35. Id.
36. Id. para. 5
37. Id. paras. 6-7.
38. See Gunningham, supranote 2, at 146, 150.
39. See, e.g., CLIFFORD RECHTSCHAFFEN & DAVID L. MARKELL, REINVENTING
ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT & THE STATE/FEDERAL RELATIONSHIP 2 (2003)
(describing criticisms lodged against government environmental law
enforcement).
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CEC process. 40 Further, the process helps to fill a gap in domestic
enforcement by empowering citizens to challenge broad agency
failures to enforce environmental laws, something that is difficult
under domestic law. 4 ' The process also provides a regional stage for
raising concerns about governance-a stage that might be helpful in
some circumstances to citizens interested in fomenting change."
Additionally, the process, in theory, is intended to be a relatively
non-resource-intensive "fire alarm" mechanism (no discovery costs,
no litigation costs, etc.) that citizens can engage to trigger a
government response and, ultimately, a quasi-independent
investigation of the practices that concern citizen submitters.
Balanced against these attractive features, a likely downside for
some citizens is that the process limits the Secretariat's authority in
important ways that make it far less powerful than a domestic
judicial body. The process does not include traditional judicial
authorities-for example, the Secretariat lacks the authority to
issue subpoenas or to impose punitive sanctions or remedial relief.4
Even its spotlighting capacity is limited because the Secretariat is
40. See Knox, supra note 17, at 93-96 (discussing the broad availability of
the process). Issues have arisen concerning the accessibility of the submissions
process. See, e.g., CEC, Joint Pub. Advisory Comm., Advice to Council No: 0801: Submissions on Enforcement Matters: From Lessons Learned to Following
Up Factual Records (Feb. 27, 2008), available at http://www.cec.org/files/pdf
/ABOUTUS/JPACAdvice-08-01_SEMen.pdf [hereinafter CEC, Advice to
Council] (noting that the process is confusing to newcomers and that it is costly
and time-consuming to prepare submissions); see also Letter from David
McGovern, Alternate Representative for Can., Comm'n for Envtl. Cooperation,
to Jane Gardner, Chair, Joint Pub. Advisory Comm., Comm'n for Envtl.
Cooperation (Aug. 14, 2008), available at http://www.cec.org/files/PDF
/ABOUTUS/Response%20to%2008-01_en.pdf [hereinafter David McGovern
Letter] (acknowledging a need to address "accessibility"). However, direct
discussion of these issues is outside the scope of this Article.
41. See Wold et al., supra note 26, at 423; see also Markell, supra note 19,
at 702; Marirose J. Pratt, Comment, The Citizen Submission Process of the
NAAEC: Filling the Gap in Judicial Review of Federal Agency Failures to
Enforce Environmental Laws, 20 EMoRY INT'L L. REV. 741, 790 (2006). In
addition, in Heckler v. Chaney the Supreme Court held that citizens generally
cannot challenge government nonenforcement decisions. Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985). The CEC mechanism is available for such
challenges.
42. See Markell, supra note 15, at 37; see also Laurence R. Helfer & AnneMarie Slaughter, Toward a Theory of Effective SupranationalAdjudication, 107
YALE L.J. 273, 283 (1997) (referring to the ability of regional tribunals to change
the "dimension and scope of the political bargaining space").
43. See Raustiala, supra note 30, at 263-66; see also Knox, supra note 17, at
57 (discussing the quasi-independent character of the Secretariat). Obviously,
the greater the barriers to meaningful participation, the less likely it is that
such participation will occur, other things being equal. See id. at 19.
44. Whether this is a "downside" to the process depends in part on one's
preference for "managerial" or "adjudication" approaches. Further, at least one
commentator has characterized the Secretariat's independent fact-finding
capacity as relatively good. See, e.g., Knox, supra note 17, at 83-84.
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not supposed to offer conclusions about the ineffectiveness of
government enforcement or recommendations about how a
government might improve its approaches.4 5
One important piece of evidence concerning the attractiveness
(or lack thereof) of the process relates to its use. The following Part
reviews citizens' use of the process between 1995 and 2009.
II. THE EMPIRICAL STORY ABOUT CITIZENS' USE OF THE CEC CITIZEN
SUBMISSIONS PROCESS AND SOME POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS

A.

The Track Record Itself Citizens' Use of the Process

There are three major actors in the citizen submissions process:
(1) residents of any North American country, including
nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") established in any of the
countries; (2) the CEC Secretariat; and (3) the CEC Council.46 As I
have argued before, one good metric for evaluating a governance
mechanism, like the CEC process, that is based on citizen use, is the
extent to which citizens use it (the "voting with their feet" metric).4
This Part reviews citizens' use of the process from its inception to
the end of October 2009.
In total, citizens have filed seventy-two submissions through
October 31, 2009.49 As Figure 1 reflects, trends in overall use show
that while there has been some ebb and flow in the annual number
of submissions, the number has stayed reasonably stable between
Figure 1 further shows that the number of
1995 and 2009.
submissions has been relatively stable over the course of each of the
three five-year periods that span the life of the process (twenty-two
submissions from 1995 to 1999, twenty-seven from 2000 to 2004,
and twenty-three from 2005 to 2009).

Nonetheless, some
45. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 13, para. 1.
commentators have been quite positive in their reviews of the transparency of
the CEC process. See Knox, supra note 17, at 88; Donald McRae, The Issue of
Transparency,in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 16, at 237, 245-46, 249-50.

46. See NAAEC, supra note 6, arts. 14-15; see also David L. Markell, The
Commission for Environmental Cooperation's Citizen Submission Process, 12

GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 545, 550 (2000) (explaining the citizen submissions
process and its various actors).
47. See Markell, supra note 19, at 665-66.
48. Some of the analysis in this Part updates an analysis of the CEC track
record I provided in an earlier article. See id. at 665-76.
49. See CEC, Registry of Citizen Submissions, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp
?PageID=751&SiteNodelD=250 (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) [hereinafter CEC,
Registry].
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FIGURE 1

Annual Submissions 1994-2009
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It is also possible to consider the CEC submissions process track
record in comparison to that of other processes.50 Some citizendriven procedures created around the same time as the CEC citizen
submissions process have received less use. For example, a total of
thirty-four submissions have been filed under the NAFTA labor side
agreement, the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation
("NAALC"),5 1 and forty citizen petitions have been filed under
Other citizen-driven procedures have
NAFTA Chapter 11.2
50. I have previously done some comparative analyses of the use of the

CEC citizen submissions process. See Markell, supra note 19, at 666-71.
Others have done comparative analyses of various other citizen-driven
processes, including procedures of the World Bank and other financial
institutions, human-rights-oriented procedures, and environmental processes.
See Daniel D. Bradlow, Private Complainantsand InternationalOrganizations:
A Comparative Study of the Independent Inspection Mechanisms in
International Financial Institutions, 36 GEO. J. INT'L L. 403, 453-62 (2005);
James L. Cavallaro & Stephanie E. Brewer, Reevaluating Regional Human
Rights Litigation in the Twenty-First Century: The Case of the Inter-American
Court, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 768 (2008); John H. Knox, The 2005 Activity of the
NAFTA Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 429 (2005).

51. U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Int'l Affairs, Status of Submissions

Under the North American Agreement on Labor Cooperation (NAALC),
http://www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/nao/status.htm#iial (last visited Apr. 26,
2010). The U.S. Department of Labor website lists a single submission in 2006
and none after that. Id. There have been a total of thirty-four submissions
under the NAALC, with none during the past several years. Telephone
Interview with John Mondejar, Senior Economist & Info. Officer, U.S. Dep't of
Labor (Nov. 25, 2009).
52. See U.S. Dep't of State, NAFTA Investor-State Arbitrations,

http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3439.htm

(visited

Apr.

26,

2010)

(containing
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received far more use." Perhaps the main, limited conclusion from
this data is that citizens have neither embraced the process
wholeheartedly and increased their use of it dramatically,5 nor
abandoned it. Instead, their use has been relatively modest and
relatively steady.
A more nuanced look at citizens' use of the process raises
several potential red flags. First, in terms of overall citizen usage,
as Figure 2 reflects, Mexico has been the subject of more than half of
the submissions filed (thirty-seven of seventy-two or 51%).
Twenty-five submissions, or 35%, have targeted Canada.56 The
United States has been the target of the fewest submissions-ten, or
14%." Since a key reason for focusing the process on enforcement
was concern about the efficacy of Mexico's performance in this
arena,5 1 it is perhaps not entirely surprising that Mexico has
received a large proportion of the submissions filed. Nevertheless,
some commentators have suggested that a significant disparity in
the use of the process to target parties' enforcement practices and
policies would raise concerns about the long-term viability of the
59
process, particularly in terms of party support.

hyperlinks to lists of the cases filed against the United States (sixteen), Canada
(twelve), Mexico (twelve) for a total number of forty cases).
53. For example, under Canada's environmental petitions process, citizens
may petition various federal departments and agencies to ask questions or
express concerns related to environmental issues. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN.
OF CAN., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT TO THE HOUSE OF COMMONS ch. 4, at 3 (2009), available at

To date,
http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/parl-cesd-200911_04_e.pdf.
over 330 petitions have been filed since the process was created in 1995. Id.
54. Citizens' use of domestic citizen-suit provisions in the United States, for
example, dwarfs their use of the CEC process. See Markell, supra note 19, at
670 n.104.
55. See CEC, Registry, supra note 49.
56. Id.
57. Id.

58. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
59. See Knox, supra note 17, at 105-06, 106 n.458 (suggesting that "if the
procedure comes to be seen as primarily directed against Canada and Mexico,
they may resist supporting the procedure and instead look for ways to increase
their control over it or otherwise weaken it" and that Mexico may be
"particularly sensitive to the possibility of an imbalance"); see also CEC, FourYear Review, supra note 29, at 8-9.
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FIGURE 2

Distribution of Submissions by Country
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Compounding the concern about a disparity in the distribution
of submissions, use of the process has changed significantly over the
years so that the imbalance in distribution of submissions among
countries has become much more pronounced. Figure 3 depicts the
use of the process during each of the three five-year periods
following filing of the first submission in 1995. This Figure shows
that the distribution of submissions in terms of the country targeted
has changed dramatically during the history of use of the process.
During the first five years of use of the process, the distributions
were relatively evenly distributed by country: United States, 27%;
Canada, 36%; and Mexico, 36%.60 During the second five years, the
distribution is less balanced: United States, 11%; Canada, 33%; and
Mexico, 56%." For the most recent five-year period, the distribution
is even more skewed: the United States, 4%; Canada, 35%; and
Mexico, 61%.62 Again, at least some commentators suggest that this
increasing imbalance has the potential to undermine support for the
process. 63

60.
6 1.
62.
63.

See CEC, Registry, supra note 49.
Id.
Id.
See supra note 59 and accompanying text.

THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS

2010]

437

FIGURE 3

Distribution of Submissions by Country
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A third and related red flag involves the trend in use of the
process in each target country. Since its inception, use of the
process to target Mexican enforcement policies and practices has
grown substantially, use of the process to challenge Canadian
enforcement practices has remained comparatively stable, and use
of the process to challenge U.S. enforcement has declined
dramatically. Figure 4 shows not only how the distribution of
submissions among the countries has changed, but also the trend in
submissions for each country. As this figure shows, use of the
process to challenge U.S. enforcement has dried up to the extent
that only a single submission has been filed during the past five
64
years.

64. See CEC, Registry, supra note 49.
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FIGURE 4

Distribution of Submissions by Year and Country
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The obvious insight from the level of citizens' use of the citizen
submissions process is that citizens' embrace of the process as a tool
to spotlight domestic enforcement has varied significantly by
country. The increasing use of the process to target Mexican
enforcement practices suggests that citizens have found the process
valuable for that purpose.' 5 For Canada, citizen reactions have been
ambivalent; experience with the process has neither inspired
citizens to increase their use of it nor led citizens to throw up their
hands in frustration and give up on the process.
For the United
States, citizens do not seem to have found the process helpful and
have largely abandoned it. 6 7
The empirical data concerning citizens' use of the citizen
65. There have been several anecdotal accounts of the value the process has
added to domestic Mexican environmental practices.

See, e.g., Greg Block,

Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere: Expanding the North
American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation into the Americas, 33
ENvTL. L. 501, 516 (2003); Beatriz Bugeda, Is NAFTA Up to Its Green
Expectations? Effective Law Enforcement Under the North American Agreement
on Environmental Cooperation, 32 U. RICH. L. REV. 1591, 1605-15 (1999);
Jonathan G. Dorn, NAAEC Citizen Submissions Against Mexico: An Analysis of
the Effectiveness of a Participatory Approach to Environmental Law
Enforcement, 20 GEO. INT'L ENvTL. L. REv. 129, 142-45 (2007).

66. Some Canadian NGOs have shared their perceptions concerning the
process and have articulated problems as well as some successes. See, e.g.,
Christensen, supra note 14, at 180-85. Mr. Christensen has filed several
submissions as a lawyer with the Sierra Legal Defense Fund. Id. at 165 n.*.
67. See infra Part II.B (discussing some of the concerns citizens have
expressed about the process and its use to date, especially involving the United
States).
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submissions process raises at least two concerns in terms of future
prospects for the process. The increasing imbalance in the use of the
process to target the effectiveness of each party's enforcement raises
In
concerns about continuing party support for the process.
addition, the data raise significant issues concerning citizens'
perceptions of the value of the process as a check or spotlight on
U.S. environmental enforcement. Citizens gingerly experimented
with using the process in its formative years (the first five-year
period) to challenge domestic U.S. enforcement, but since then use
has dropped precipitously."
This track record raises the obvious question of whether there
are ways to revamp the process so that citizens want to use it,
particularly to challenge U.S. enforcement. To answer this question,
it is important to assess why citizens have abandoned the process as
a tool to challenge U.S. enforcement." I now turn to that issue.

B. Why Has Citizens' Use of the Citizen Submissions Process to
Challenge U.S. Enforcement Declined So Dramatically?
Three reasons seem especially plausible to explain why citizens
have not taken more advantage of the CEC process to challenge U.S.
enforcement practices and policies, its fairness (or potential lack
thereof), its pace, and its "toothless" character.'o

68. See supra p. 438 fig.4, note 64 and accompanying text.
69. As part of any overall effort to assess the process and identify possible
alternatives, it certainly would be relevant to explore why the process seems to
be popular in Mexico and why the process has enjoyed continued attention in
Canada. It is worth emphasizing that the problems with the procedure I review
in the next Subpart do not seem to be preventing the Canadian and Mexican
NGOs from using it. This may be because the issues I discuss are all relative in
the sense that the fairness, slowness, and toothlessness concerns I highlight
concerning the CEC process must be considered in the context of domestic
alternatives. My speculation is that, if the concerns in the text are addressed,
citizen use of the process is likely to increase in other counties as well as in the
United States. However, I do not explore these issues in this Article.
70. There is limited empirical data on citizens' views about the process and
the reasons for their disaffection. I focus on the three reasons discussed in this
Article based on my experience and my review of the literature. A recent
survey that Professor Tom Tyler and I completed concerning the CEC process
suggests considerable skepticism on the part of citizens toward the process. See
David L. Markell & Tom R. Tyler, Using Empirical Research to Design
Government Citizen ParticipationProcesses: A Case Study of Citizens' Roles in
Environmental Compliance and Enforcement, 57 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 35 (2008).

Respondents ranked the process last in terms of desirability among the eleven
options we presented for participating in environmental law enforcement. Id.
Respondents also indicated that they were less likely to use the citizen
submissions process than any of the other processes we listed. Id.
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1. ConcernsAbout the Fairnessor Neutrality of the Processn
Professor Chris Wold (a one-time submitter) and others have
noted on numerous occasions that significant concerns exist about
the fairness of the process, especially with respect to the role the
Wold suggests that several Council actions and
Council plays.
decisions "have eroded public confidence in the process."
Numerous other commentators have expressed concern that the
Council's performance has raised questions about the neutrality of
the process and diminished citizens' trust in it.74 The proceduraljustice literature documents that the perceived fairness or justness
of a process influences perceptions of the acceptability of the process
and its legitimacy.75 Domestic courts and legislatures have insisted
that administrative and judicial adjudication be conducted with
neutral decision makers and fair processes in order to enhance the
legitimacy and integrity of decision-making procedures.7 ' Based on
the anecdotal information, and in the view of many close observers,
citizens' concerns about the fairness of the procedure-especially the
to their
contributed
have
performance-likely
Council's
disenchantment with the process and diminishing use of it.77

71. I have discussed concerns about the fairness of the CEC process in
several earlier articles. See, e.g., Markell, supra note 19, at 688-707. This
Subpart is intended to complement and update that earlier work.
72. See Wold, supra note 6, at 206 (suggesting a need to "mend[ I the
inherent structural problems that allow the Parties to change the scope and
nature of a citizen submission concerning its own enforcement failure"); Wold et
al., supra note 26, at 417-18 (criticizing the Council).
73.

Wold, supra note 6, at 228; accord CEC, Ten Years, supra note 10, at

44-46; Markell, supra note 19, at 699-707. Professor Sanford Gaines suggests
that the parties' governments have been embarrassed by the citizen
submissions, and, as a result, the parties have "sharply reduce[d]" their political
support for the process. Gaines, supra note 10, at 269.
74. See Letter from Randy L. Christensen, Staff Lawyer, Sierra Legal Def.
Fund, to Members of the CEC Council (Mar. 6, 2002), available at
http://www.cec.org/files/pdflABOUTUS/Sierra toCouncil-BCMining.pdf
(stating that the Council's actions could "threaten[ I to strip the citizen
submission process of its integrity, utility and legitimacy"); see also Garver,
supra note 15, at 35. For a discussion of several such sources, see Markell,
supra note 19, at 688-707.
75. I discuss the CEC process in considerable depth in light of the
procedural-justice literature in two recent articles. See Markell, supra note 19,
at 677-707; Markell & Tyler, supra note 70, at 22-34.
76. See 2 KENNETH CuLP DAVIS & RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 9.8, at 67-68 (3d ed. 1994).
77. As noted supra note 69, considering why use has only diminished in the
United States is beyond the scope of this Article.
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2. The Slow, and Slower, Pace of the CEC Handling of
Submissions
Frustration with the pace of the process likely contributes to
citizen skepticism." In this Subpart, I review the pace of the CEC
treatment of the submissions that have made it the furthest in the
process. I first review the treatment of the submissions that have
led to the fifteen factual records released as of October 31, 2009..
78. Several CEC documents recognize the slow pace of the process. See
CEC, Four-Year Review, supra note 29, at 21 (noting that delays "place at risk
the public credibility of the process"); CEC, Advice to Council, supra note 40
("The procedure is too slow."); CEC, Lessons Learned, supra note 14, at 9-10.
79. See CEC, Factual Record: ALCA-Iztapalapa II (SEM-03-004) (Nov.

16, 2007), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/73/6757_Alca-Iztapalapa
-II en.pdf [hereinafter CEC, ALCA-Iztapalapa II Factual Record]; CEC,
Factual Record: Aquanova Submission (SEM-98-006) (May 5, 2003), available

at

http://www.cec.org/Storage/71/6550_98-6-FR-E.pdf

[hereinafter

CEC,

Aquanova Factual Record]; CEC, Factual Record: BC Logging Submission

(SEM-00-004) (June 27, 2003), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage
/70/6361_00-4-FFRen.pdf [hereinafter CEC, BC Logging Factual Record];
CEC, Factual Record: BC Mining Submission (SEM-98-004) (June 27, 2003),

available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/68/6172_98-4-FFRen.pdf [hereinafter
CEC, BC Mining Factual Record]; CEC, Factual Record: Molymex II
Submission (SEM-00-005) (Aug. 25, 2008), available at http://www.cec.org

/Storage/70/6391 00-5-FRen.pdf

[hereinafter

CEC, Molymex

II

Factual

Record]; CEC, Factual Record: Montreal Technoparc Submission (SEM-03-

http://www.cec.org/Storage
available at
2008),
28,
(Mar.
005)
/74/6784_TechnoparcFR-en.pdf [hereinafter CEC, Montreal Technoparc Factual
Record]; CEC, Factual Record: Oldman River II Submission (SEM-97-006)

(June

27,

2003),

available at

http://www.cec.org/Storage/69/6250_97-6

-FFR-en.pdf [hereinafter CEC, Oldman River II FactualRecord]; CEC, Factual
Record: Ontario Logging Submissions (SEM-02-001) and (SEM-04-006) (June

20, 2006), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/72/6583_CCE-21 english.pdf
[hereinafter CEC, Ontario Logging Factual Record]; CEC, Factual Record:
Pulp and Paper Submission (SEM-02-003) (June 28, 2006), available at

http://www.cec.org/Storage/72/6649 SEM-02-003-FR en.pdf [hereinafter CEC,
Pulp and Paper Factual Record]; CEC, Factual Record: Rio Magdalena
Submission (SEM-97-002) (Oct. 24, 2003), available at http://www.cec.org

/Storage/67/6076_97-2-FFR-en.pdf [hereinafter CEC, Rio Magdalena Factual
Record]; CEC, Final Factual Record: Cruise Ship Pier Project in Cozumel,
Quintana Roo (SEM-96-001) (Oct. 24, 1997), available at http://www.cec.org

/Storage/66/5989 ACF17D1.PDF [hereinafter CEC, Cozumel Factual Record];
CEC, Final Factual Record for Submission SEM-97-001 (BC Aboriginal
Fisheries Commission et al.) (May 30, 2000), available at http://www.cec.org

/Storage/68/6220_.BC-Hydr-Fact-record en.pdf [hereinafter CEC, BC Hydro
Factual Record]; CEC, Final Factual Record for Submission SEM-99-002
(Migratory Birds) (Apr. 22, 2003), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/71

/6478_MigratoryBirds-FFREN.pdf [hereinafter CEC, Migratory Birds Factual
Record]; CEC, Final Factual Record: TarahumaraSubmission (SEM-00-006)

http://www.cec.org/Storage/70/6424
available at
2005),
26,
(July
_TarahumaraFR en.pdf [hereinafter CEC, TarahumaraFactualRecord]; CEC,
Metales y Derivados Final Factual Record (SEM-98-007) (Feb. 7, 2002),

available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/84/7955 98-7-FFR-e.pdf [hereinafter
CEC, Metales y Derivados FactualRecord]. These fifteen Factual Records arose
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These are "closed files" in the sense that the CEC has completed its
work on them. I then turn to the six "open files" that have made it
through the Secretariat-recommendation stage, but have not been
completed.
a. "Closed Files." The average length of time from the filing of
a submission to the issuance of a factual record for the fifteen
factual records the CEC has issued is 1645 days, or approximately
4.5 years.8o Based on two recent reports about the domestic U.S.
court system, it appears that the citizen submissions process takes
far longer from start to finish than does a case brought before the
U.S. courts. A 2008 comparison of civil jury-trial litigation in U.S.
state and federal courts found that the median case-processing time
from filing to verdict was twenty-three months in state courts and
out of sixteen submissions. Two submissions involving Ontario Logging were
consolidated prior to development of a factual record. I focus on the
submissions that led to development of factual records because these tend to be
the most significant submissions in terms of number of CEC actions required
and amount of CEC attention received. This also provides a more manageable
number of submissions to review-fifteen versus the total of seventy-two
submissions filed as of October 31, 2009. See CEC, Registry, supra note 49.
80. See CEC, ALCA-Iztapalapa II, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID
=2001&ContentlD=2383&SiteNodelD=545&BL_- ExpandlD= (last visited Apr.
26, 2010) (1910 days); CEC, Aquanova, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID
=2001&ContentlD=2373&SiteNodelD=545&BLExpandlD= (last visited Apr.
26, 2010) (1735 days); CEC, BC Hydro, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD
=2001&ContentlD=2358&SiteNodelD=545&BLExpandID= (last visited Apr.
26, 2010) (1166 days); CEC, BC Logging, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD
=2001&ContentID=2365&SiteNodelD=545&BL ExpandID= (last visited Apr.
26, 2010) (1244 days); CEC, BC Mining, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID
=2001&ContentID=2355&SiteNodeID=545&BL-ExpandID= (last visited Apr.
26, 2010) (1870 days); CEC, Cozumel, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID
=2001&ContentID=2346&SiteNodeID=545&BL_.ExpandID= (last visited Apr.
26, 2010) (646 days); CEC, Metales y Derivados , http://www.cec.org/Page.asp
(last
?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2372&SiteNodelD=545&BLExpandID=
visited Apr. 26, 2010) (1207 days); CEC, Migratory Birds , http://www.cec.org
IPage.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2370&SiteNodelD=545&BLExpandID=
(last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (1254 days); CEC, Molymex II,
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=2001&ContentlD=2366&SiteNodelD=545
&BLExpandID= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (1652 days); CEC, Montreal
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2384
Technoparc,
&SiteNodelD=545&BL_.ExpandlD= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (1776 days);
CEC, Oldman River II, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD
=2359&SiteNodelD=545&BLExpandID= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (2137
days); CEC, Ontario Logging, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001
&ContentlD=2375&SiteNodelD=545&BLExpandlD= (last visited Apr. 26,
2010) (1827 days); CEC, Pulp and Paper, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID
=2001&ContentID=2377&SiteNodeID=545&BL ExpandID= (last visited Apr.
26, 2010) (1736 days); CEC, Rio Magdalena, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp
(last
?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2350&SiteNodeID=545&BL_.ExpandID=
visited Apr. 26, 2010) (2462 days); CEC, Tarahumara, http://www.cec.org
/Page.asp?PagelD=2001&ContentD=2367&SiteNodeID=545&BLExpandID=
(last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (2049 days).
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eighteen months in federal district courts." The 2008 annual report
for the U.S. courts found that, for 2008, the "national median time
from filing to disposition for civil cases was 8.1 months."8 Thus, it
seems likely that U.S. citizens and others view the CEC timetable to
be frustratingly slow.
Further, the pace has slowed considerably in recent years. To
assess whether the CEC pace in handling submissions has varied
over time, I grouped the submissions that have led to issuance of
factual records into three categories: (1) "early" factual records
(there are three of these, issued in 1997, 2000, and 2002);13 (2) "the
2003" factual records (six of these);8 and (3) more recent factual
records (six of these as well).85 For the three factual records issued
during the earlier years of the process, the average number of days
between when the submission was filed and the factual record was
released was 1006." For the six factual records released in 2003,
the average number of days from submission to release was 1784.7
For the remaining six factual records released since 2003 (one in
2004, zero in 2005, two in 2006, one in 2007, and two in 200888), the
average number of days from submission to release was 1825."
81. Thomas H. Cohen, General Civil Jury Trial Litigation in State and
Federal Courts: A Statistical Portrait,5 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 593, 606-07

(2008). The article explains the methodology Professor Cohen used in compiling
this information, including the time frames studied, limits on the types of cases
involved, and the particular courts studied. Id. at 595-99.
82. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2008 ANNUAL
REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 19

at
available
(2008),
/JudicialBusinespdfversion.pdf.

http://www.uscourts.gov/judbus2008

83. CEC, Cozumel FactualRecord, supra note 79; CEC, BC Hydro Factual
Record, supra note 79; CEC, Metales y DerivadosFactualRecord, supra note 79.
84. CEC, Aquanova Factual Record, supra note 79; CEC, BC Logging
FactualRecord, supra note 79; CEC, BC Mining FactualRecord, supra note 79;
CEC, Oldman River II Factual Record, supra note 79; CEC, Rio Magdalena
Factual Record, supra note 79; CEC, Migratory Birds Factual Record, supra

note 79.
85. CEC, ALCA-Iztapalapa II Factual Record, supra note 79; CEC,
Molymex II Factual Record, supra note 79; CEC, Montreal Technoparc Factual
Record, supra note 79; CEC, Ontario Logging Factual Record, supra note 79;
CEC, Pulp and Paper Factual Record, supra note 79; CEC, Tarahumara
FactualRecord, supra note 79.

86. See CEC, BC Hydro, supra note 80 (1166 days); CEC, Cozumel, supra
note 80 (646 days); CEC, Metales y Derivados, supra note 80 (1207 days).
87. See CEC, Aquanova, supra note 80 (1737 days); CEC, BC Logging,
supra note 80 (1244 days); CEC, BC Mining, supra note 80 (1870 days); CEC,
Migratory Birds, supra note 80 (1254 days); CEC, Oldman River II, supra note
80 (2137 days); CEC, Rio Magdalena, supra note 80 (2462 days).
88.

See supranote 85.

89. See CEC, ALCA-Iztapalapa II, supra note 80 (1910 days); CEC,
Molymex II, supra note 80 (1652 days); CEC, Montreal Technoparc, supra note
80 (1776 days); CEC, Ontario Logging, supra note 80 (1827 days); CEC, Pulp
and Paper, supra note 80 (1736 days); CEC, Tarahumara, supra note 80 (2049
days).
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Thus, the CEC is taking much longer to complete and issue factual
records for the more recent submissions than it did earlier in the
process (an average of approximately two years longer for the 2003
and later factual records than for the first three records).90
b. "Open Files." To further assess the pace of recent CEC
activity, I reviewed the six currently active submissions for which
the Secretariat has recommended preparation of a factual record."
90. The amount of time it takes the Council to approve public release of
factual records has nearly tripled. For the first three factual records the
Council took an average of fifty-eight days to vote to release the record. See
CEC, BC Hydro, supra note 80 (12 days); CEC, Cozumel, supra note 80 (91
days); CEC, Metales y Derivados, supra note 80 (70 days). For the six factual
records it issued in 2003, the Council took an average of forty-six days to vote to
release the factual record. See CEC, Aquanova, supra note 80 (49 days); CEC,
BC Logging, supra note 80 (41 days); CEC, BC Mining, supra note 80 (41 days);
CEC, Migratory Birds, supra note 80 (60 days); CEC, Oldman River II, supra
note 80 (41 days); CEC, Rio Magdalena, supra note 80 (42 days). For the most
recent six factual records, the Council has taken an average of 151 days. See
CEC, ALCA-Izatapalapa II, supra note 80 (196 days); CEC, Molymex II, supra
note 80 (30 days); CEC, Montreal Technoparc, supra note 80 (87 days); CEC,
Ontario Logging, supra note 80 (225 days); CEC, Pulp and Paper, supra note 80
(217 days); CEC, Tarahumara, supra note 80 (148 days). Public release of the
factual record is largely a ministerial decision. See Knox, supra note 17, at 67
(noting that "it seems unlikely that the Council would ever decline to make a
factual record public").
Yet it has taken the Council an average of
approximately five months to make the decision for the last six factual records.
Thus, the Council routinely exceeds the NAAEC's recommended time frame for
action. See NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 15, para. 7 (stating that the Council may
"make the final factual record publicly available, normally within 60 days
following its submission").
91. CEC, Coal-FiredPower Plants-Article 15(1) Notification to Council
that Development of a FactualRecord Is Warranted,CEC Doc. A14/SEM/04-

005/48/ADV (Dec. 5, 2005), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/75/6868_04
-5-ADV en.pdf; CEC, Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo II-Article
15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record Is

Warranted, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/05-003/39/ADV (Apr. 4, 2007), available at
http://www.cec.org/Storage/76/6979-05-3-ADV en.pdf; CEC, Ex Hacienda El
Hospital II and Ex Hacienda El Hospital III (Consolidated)-Article15(1)
Notification to Council that Development of a Factual Record Is Warranted,

CEC Doc. A14/SEM-06-003 & SEM-06-004/54/ADV (May 7, 2008), available
at http://www.cec.org/Storage/76/7027_06-3-4-ADV-e.pdf; CEC, Lake Chapala
II- Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a Factual
Record is Warranted, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/03-003/45/ADV (May 18, 2005),
available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/73/6724_03-3-ADV-en.pdf; CEC, Quebec
Automobiles-Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a
Factual Record Is Warranted, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/04-007/19/ADV (May 5,

2005), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/75/6925_04-7-ADVen.pdf; CEC,
Species at Risk-Article 15(1) Notification to Council that Development of a

Factual Record Is Warranted, CEC Doc. A14/SEM/06-005/30/ADV (Sept. 10,
2007), available at http://www.cec.org/Storage/76/7051_06-5-ADVen.pdf. Note
that Ex Hacienda El Hospital III (SEM-06-004) was consolidated with Ex
Hacienda El Hospital II (SEM-06-003). These two submissions are treated as a
single submission for purposes of this analysis.
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Unlike the fifteen factual records I discuss in the previous Subpart,
which are "closed files" in the sense that the CEC has completed its
work on them, these six are "open files" in that CEC work is
*92
currently ongoing.
On the plus side, things have gone relatively smoothly for the
more recent submissions during the early stages of the process, at
least in the sense that the amount of time each stage has taken, on
average, is comparable to the amount of time each such stage took
for the closed files. Thus, the amount of time for (1) the Secretariat
to request a response (98 days for the six open files versus 164 days
for the closed files discussed above), (2) the relevant party to
provide a response (86 days for the six open files versus 73 days for
the closed files discussed above), 94 and (3) the Secretariat to
92. I focus on the open files that have made it through more steps in the
CEC process than the other open files because one would expect that these files
have received the most CEC attention.
93. For the open files, see CEC, Coal-Fired Power Plants,
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=2001&ContentlD=2390&SiteNodeID= 2 50
&BL ExpandID= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (161 days); CEC, Environmental
II, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001
Pollution in Hermosillo
&ContentlD=2395&SiteNodelD=250&BLExpandID= (last visited Apr. 26,
2010) (75 days); CEC, Ex Hacienda El Hospital II, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp
(last
?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2399&SiteNodelD=250&BLExpandID=
visited Apr. 26, 2010) (44 days); CEC, Lake Chapala II, http://www.cec.org/Page
(last
.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2382&SiteNodelD=250&BL-ExpandlD=
visited Apr. 26, 2010) (210 days); CEC, Quebec Automobiles,
2
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2392&SiteNodeID= 50
at
Species
and
CEC,
days);
(30
2010)
Apr.
26,
&BLExpandID= (last visited
Risk, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=2001&ContentlD=2401&SiteNodelD
=250&BLExpandID= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010) (66 days). For the closed files,
see CEC, ALCA-Iztapalapa II, supra note 80 (182 days); CEC, Aquanova, supra
note 80 (176 days); CEC, BC Hydro, supra note 80 (43 days); CEC, BC Logging,
supra note 80 (54 days); CEC, BC Mining, supra note 80 (361 days); CEC,
Cozumel, supra note 80 (22 days); CEC, Metales y Derivados, supra note 80
(133 days); CEC, Migratory Birds, supra note 80 (36 days); CEC, Molymex II,
supra note 80 (202 days); CEC, Montreal Technopare, supra note 80 (33 days);
CEC, Oldman River II, supra note 80 (216 days); CEC, Ontario Logging, supra
note 80 (21 days); CEC, Pulp and Paper, supra note 80 (32 days); CEC, Rio
Magdalena, supra note 80 (419 days); and CEC, Tarahumara, supra note 80
(524 days).

94. For the open files, see CEC, Coal-Fired Power Plants, supra note 93 (60

days); CEC, Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo II, supra note 93 (99 days);
CEC, Ex Hacienda El Hospital II, supra note 93 (133 days); CEC, Lake Chapala
II, supra note 93 (103 days); CEC, Quebec Automobiles, supranote 93 (60 days);
and CEC, Species at Risk, supra note 93 (59 days). For the closed files, see
CEC, ALCA-Iztapalapa II, supra note 80 (86 days); CEC, Aquanova, supra note
80 (97 days); CEC, BC Hydro, supra note 80 (67 days); CEC, BC Logging, supra
note 80 (63 days); CEC, BC Mining, supra note 80 (75 days); CEC, Cozumel,
supra note 80 (46 days); CEC, Metales y Derivados, supra note 80 (88 days);
CEC, Migratory Birds, supra note 80 (68 days); CEC, Molymex II, supra note 80
(91 days); CEC, Montreal Technoparc, supra note 80 (60 days); CEC, Oldman
River TI, supra note 80 (66 days); CEC, Ontario Logging, supra note 80 (59
days); CEC, Pulp and Paper, supra note 80 (60 days); CEC, Rio Magdalena,
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recommend development of a factual record (307 days for the six
open files versus 372 days for the closed files discussed above) 5 is
generally roughly in line with the time these stages took for the
closed files discussed above.96
The pace during the latter stages of the citizen submissions
process has been much slower for the six currently active
submissions that have proceeded to the stage of a Secretariat
recommendation than for the earlier submissions that reached this
stage.
Figure 5 below shows the pace at which these six
submissions are proceeding through the citizen submissions process.

supra note 80 (77 days); and CEC, Tarahumara, supranote 80 (101 days).

95. For the open files, see CEC, Coal-Fired Power Plants, supra note 93
(224 days); CEC, Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo II, supra note 93 (412
days); CEC, Ex Hacienda El Hospital II, supra note 93 (488 days); CEC, Lake
Chapala II, supra note 93 (413 days); CEC, Quebec Automobiles, supra note 93
(93 days); and CEC, Species at Risk, supra note 93 (214 days). For the closed
files, see CEC, ALCA-Iztapalapa II, supra note 80 (263 days); CEC, Aquanova,
supra note 80 (409 days); CEC, BC Hydro, supra note 80 (280 days); CEC, BC
Logging, supra note 80 (382 days); CEC, BC Mining, supra note 80 (611 days),
CEC, Cozumel, supra note 80 (79 days); CEC, Metales y Derivados, supra note
80 (279 days); CEC, Migratory Birds, supra note 80 (290 days); CEC, Molymex
II, supra note 80 (336 days); CEC, Montreal Technoparc, supra note 80 (157
days); CEC, Oldman River II, supra note 80 (371 days); CEC, Ontario Logging,
supra note 80 (201 days); CEC, Pulp and Paper, supra note 80 (428 days); CEC,
Rio Magdalena, supra note 80 (1292 days); and CEC, Tarahumara, supra note
80 (195 days).
96. My expectation is that most commentators would agree that these early

stages have taken far too long for both completed and pending submissions.
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As Figure 5 shows, for the most recent six such
recommendations it took the Council an average of 784 days to make
the decision to direct the Secretariat to develop a draft factual
record following receipt of a Secretariat recommendation." It took
97. Because the Council has only directed the Secretariat to develop a draft
factual record for three submissions (Lake Chapala II, Coal-Fired Power Plants,
and Quebec Automobiles), the last column to the right in Figure 5 is based on
the Secretariat's work on these three submissions. Because a draft has not yet
been submitted, I used October 31, 2009, as the draft-factual-record submission
date.
98. See CEC, Coal-Fired Power Plants, supra note 93 (931 days); CEC,
Environmental Pollution in Hermosillo II, supra note 93 (941 days); CEC, Ex

Hacienda El Hospital II, supra note 93 (537 days); CEC, Lake Chapala II, supra
note 93 (1108 days); CEC, Quebec Automobiles, supra note 93 (405 days); CEC,
Species at Risk, supra note 93 (782 days). I used October 31, 2009, as a Council
decision date on the Secretariat's recommendation if the Council had not yet
made a decision. Because the Council had only acted on three of these
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the Council an average of 234 days to make this decision for the first
fifteen factual records." Thus, it has taken the Council more than
three times as long (and counting) to make a decision on the most
recent six Secretariat recommendations as it took the Council to
decide on the first fifteen. Figure 6 below shows the amount of time
it has taken the Council to decide to authorize preparation of a
factual record over the course of the process.

recommendations by October 31, 2009, the actual average length of time for the
Council to make this decision ultimately will be well over 784 days by the time
it acts on all six open files.
99. See CEC, ALCA-Iztapalapa II, supra note 80 (290 days); CEC,
Aquanova, supra note 80 (469 days); CEC, BC Hydro, supra note 80 (58 days);
CEC, BC Logging, supra note 80 (112 days); CEC, BC Mining, supra note 80
(189 days); CEC, Cozumel, supra note 80 (56 days); CEC, Metales y Derivados,
supra note 80 (71 days); CEC, Migratory Birds, supra note 80 (336 days); CEC,
Molymex II, supra note 80 (148 days); CEC, Montreal Technoparc, supra note
80 (123 days); CEC, Oldman River II, supra note 80 (851 days); CEC, Ontario
Logging, supra note 80 (486 days); CEC, Pulp and Paper, supra note 80 (64
days); CEC, Rio Magdalena, supra note 80 (30 days); CEC, Tarahumara, supra
note 80 (236 days). The Council determined not to authorize a factual record for
two submissions, Cytrar II and Quebec Hog Farms. See CEC, Cytrar II,
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2368&SiteNodelD=250
&BLExpandlD= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010); CEC, Quebec Hog Farms,
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD=2351&SiteNodelD=250
&BLExpandID= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). There is one submission for
which a factual record was authorized but the submission was withdrawn.
CEC, El Boludo Project, http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PageID=2001&ContentlD
=2378&SiteNodelD=250&BLExpandID= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010). I have
not included these three submissions in my analysis.
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FIGURE 6*
Council Decision: Mean number of days between recommendation and
decision to produce Factual Record by Year Submission Filed
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*For the 2005 and 2006 submissions for which the Secretariat has
recommended development of a factual record but on which the Council had
not acted as of October 31, 2009, I assumed a Council decision date of October
31, 2009.

The long and short of this record is that, for the three pending
submissions that are furthest along (i.e., the submissions for which
the Secretariat is currently drafting a factual record), the average
amount of time from submission until preparation of the draft
factual record is 2016 daysoo (assuming a draft-factual-record
submittal date of October 31, 2009).'0 This is an average of almost
100. See CEC, Coal-Fired Power Plants, supra note 93 (1871 days); CEC,
Lake Chapala II, supra note 93 (2353 days); CEC, Quebec Automobiles, supra
note 93 (1823 days).
101. Like the Council, the Secretariat has contributed to the drawing out of
the process for more recent submissions. The Secretariat seems to have slowed
down in its performance of its responsibility to develop draft factual records for
the most recent submissions. The Secretariat is currently in the process of
developing factual records for three submissions per the Council's directions.
See CEC, Coal-Fired Power Plants, supranote 93; CEC, Lake Chapala II, supra
note 93; CEC, Quebec Automobiles, supra note 93. Again using October 31,
2009, as a cut-off date, the Secretariat had spent an average of 750 days to
prepare a draft record for each of these three submissions, compared to the
average of 621 days it took the Secretariat to prepare drafts for the fifteen
factual records that are already completed. Compare CEC, Coal-Fired Power
Plants, supra note 93 (495 days), CEC, Lake Chapala II, supra note 93 (519
days), and CEC, Quebec Automobiles, supra note 93 (1235 days), with CEC,
ALCA-Iztapalapa II, supra note 80 (788 days), CEC, Aquanova, supra note 80
(476 days), CEC, BC Hydro, supra note 80 (643 days), CEC., BC Logging, supra
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five and a half years for each submission and already longer than it
took the CEC to issue the vast majority of its first fifteen factual
records. Yet each of the three submissions still has several stages to
go-the Secretariat's submission of its draft factual record to the
parties for comment, the parties' submission of their comments on
the draft to the Secretariat, the Secretariat's finalization of the
factual record and submission of it to the Council, and the Council's
decision to release the factual record. 102 Thus, it is likely to take the
CEC more than six years to complete the factual record process for
each of these submissions, an average of approximately two years
longer than it took for the first fifteen factual records.
For what is intended to be a relatively straightforward,
spotlighting mechanism, the process increasingly might remind one
of the children's song "The Song that Never Ends."o3 The delays in
developing and releasing a factual record may impact citizens' views
of the distributive justice of the process, since the delays mean the
process takes a long time even to shine the limited spotlight
contemplated.' 0 4 Similarly, the Council's delays conceivably may
influence citizens' sense of the procedural justice of the process if
they believe delays are due, at least in part, to the Council's lack of
commitment to the process.' 0 I treat the delays as an independent
source of concern because they do not, without more, fit neatly into
either traditional category. Further, my sense is that the slow (and

note 80 (515 days), CEC, BC Mining, supra note 80 (497 days), CEC, Cozumel,
supra note 80 (264 days), CEC, Metales y Derivados, supra note 80 (503 days),
CEC, Migratory Birds, supra note 80 (377 days), CEC, Molymex II, supra note
80 (731 days), CEC, Montreal Technoparc, supra note 80 (1200 days), CEC,
Oldman River II, supra note 80 (517 days), CEC, Ontario Logging, supra note
80 (749 days), CEC, Pulp and Paper, supra note 80 (838 days), CEC, Rio
Magdalena, supra note 80 (509 days), and CEC, Tarahumara, supra note 80
(715 days). The Secretariat does not completely control progress in developing
factual records, since it is dependent on submissions of information from the
parties and others.
102. See NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 15.
103. Norman Martin, The Song that Never Ends (lyrics on file with author).
104. See Markell & Tyler, supra note 70, at 4 ("The concept of 'distributive
justice' focuses on the fairness or appropriateness of the procedure's outcome.").
A factual record is the end product of the process and likely the brightest
spotlight the process creates. See NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 15. But the entire
process operates quite transparently and, as a result, the submission of
information by submitters, parties, and others, and the analyses and
information provided by the Secretariat, all contribute to the spotlighting effect
of the process. See Knox, supra note 17, at 88 ("On the whole, the NACEC
submissions procedure receives high marks for transparency.").
105. See Markell & Tyler, supra note 70, at 4 ("'[Plrocedural justice' involves
the extent to which citizens value a process because of its procedural features.");
Tom R. Tyler, What Is ProceduralJustice?: Criteria Used by Citizens to Assess
the Fairnessof Legal Procedures, 22 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 103, 128 (1988) (defining
"procedural justice" as involving participants' satisfaction with the decisionmaking processes).
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slower) pace that has characterized the process deserves special
attention because it offers a rare opportunity for policy makers to
improve the process and their credibility with little downside and
deserves to be "teed up" as such.

3.

The "Toothless" Characterof the Mechanism.

The CEC process likely appears remarkably toothless to
environmental lawyers and environmental
domestic U.S.
domestic
to
compared
organizations
nongovernmental
environmental enforcement mechanisms. Three features stand out
as contributing to the "toothless" character of the process.
First, unlike domestic litigation, no remedial relief or punitive
sanctions are available.10 6 Thus, even if it is clear that a party's
enforcement practices are flawed, there is no provision for injunctive
relief directing the party to improve. Similarly, there is no provision
for monetary sanctions as an incentive to upgrade enforcement
policies and practices.107 Instead, the process ultimately is solely a
reflexive, information-gathering, and spotlighting mechanism that
lacks the remedial or punitive capacity to make any party take any
action.108

Second, the process is limited even as a spotlighting
mechanism. At the end of the day, the Secretariat provides
information about the effectiveness of a party's enforcement policies
and practices. But the Secretariat is not supposed to include
ultimate conclusions as to whether a party has failed to enforce its
environmental laws effectively or recommendations for how a party
As Professor Raustiala has suggested, "A
might improve.'o
recurring critique of the current procedure is that the Secretariat
may not make any explicit recommendations, nor does it have the

106. See David S. Baron, NAFTA and the Environment-Making the Side
Agreement Work, 12 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 603, 606 (1995) (noting that "the

factual record itself does not bring with it any legal consequences").
107. While Part V of the NAAEC creates a party-to-party process for
persistent failures to effectively enforce environmental laws-a process that
incorporates the possibility of monetary sanctions-see NAAEC, supra note 6,
arts. 22-36, this process has never been used. In fact, in its 2004 report on the
CEC, the Ten-Year Review and Assessment Committee recommended "that the
Parties publicly commit to refrain from invoking Part Five [of the NAAECI for a
period of 10 years" because of the concern that such a sanctions process would
prove counterproductive to cooperative environmental protection. CEC, Ten
Years, supra note 10, at 55.
108. See Eric W. Orts, Reflexive EnvironmentalLaw, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 1227,

1232 (1995) (describing "reflexive law" as using mechanisms like public
disclosure and scrutiny to influence social and legal change).
109. See Greg Block, Trade and Environment in the Western Hemisphere:
Expanding the North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation into

the Americas, 33 ENvTL. L. 501, 542 (2003) (noting that "factual records are not
to include conclusions or recommendations").
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power to reach affirmative conclusions as to whether the party in
question is in fact 'failing to effectively enforce' its law."" 0
Third, again in contrast to judicial mechanisms, the CEC forum
does not retain any sort of continuing jurisdiction over the matters
at issue in a submission. There is, in other words, no follow-through
capacity. Even if a party's enforcement practices are palpably
problematic, the process ends with the issuance of a factual
record."' As Chris Wold-the lawyer for the only U.S. submission to
have produced a factual record-explained, the factual record is the
"dead end" of the process because "the NAAEC does not require
governments to address issues raised in the factual record."112 Wold
indicates that the submission he prepared "resulted in no changes"
in the way the relevant government agency (the U.S. Fish & Wildlife
Service) implemented the statute the submission charged it with
implementing ineffectually (the Migratory Bird Treaty Act)."'
Exacerbating the situation, the Council recently rejected the
Joint Public Advisory Committee's ("JPAC") plan to review the
progress made with regard to issues raised in published factual
records.114 The Council informed the JPAC that the NAAEC does
not contemplate follow-up " and that JPAC's contemplated review
"would be beyond the scope of the NAAEC."n' In short, the Council
has been dismissive of the idea of incorporating any type of auditing
function to assess the nature of a party's actions or to address the
concerns raised by a submission."'

110. Raustiala, supra note 13, at 397. Professor Knox similarly recognizes
that the Secretariat is not permitted to make legal conclusions about
environmental enforcement and may solely make factual findings but he argues
that the distinction between factual findings and legal conclusions is likely to be
"irrelevant to the effectiveness of the procedure," in part because "[ilf the
factual record is well-prepared, its readers will be able to draw their own
conclusions as to that ultimate question." See Knox, supra note 17, at 85-87.
111. See Knox, supra note 17, at 85.
112. Wold, supra note 6, at 231.
113. Id.
114. See David McGovern Letter, supra note 40.
115. Id. (noting that the submissions process "does not contemplate any
action by the Secretariat or the Council after the publication of a factual
record").
116. Id.
117. Other features weaken the process beyond those described in the text.
For example, the Secretariat lacks subpoena authority. Wold et al., supra note
26, at 421. In addition, there are limits on citizens' opportunities to participate
in the process. See Markell, supra note 19, at 683-88. Another possible
drawback for prospective U.S. submitters that does not fit neatly into either the

distributive- or procedural-justice category is that there is no provision for
recouping costs expended in investigating and pursuing a submission.
ROBERT

L.

See

GLICKSMAN ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION: LAW AND POLICY

1037 (5th ed. 2007) ("The ability of public interest groups to recover their
attorneys' fees and court costs can be an important inducement to initiate
citizen suits.").
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In sum, it is clear that the process is limited in several
important respects. Some of the features the CEC process lacks
have been touted as important features in the success of other
citizen-triggered processes and their absence may well be
undermining the prospects of the process." Yet there also is the
possibility that spotlighting processes may be effective without
coercive power.119 Further study is warranted to learn how much
the "toothless" character of the process has influenced citizens'
interest in using it. Frustration with the limited benefits the
process has yielded has, in my view, likely dampened NGOs'
enthusiasm for using the process. It is not clear, however, to what
degree these limited benefits flow from the limited powers inherent
in the process or from the perceptions that the process has not been
administered fairly or in a timely way (the concerns I discuss in the
preceding Subparts).

C.

Some Concluding Thoughts

Of course, the past is not necessarily a prologue for the future of
the citizen submissions process or any other mechanism. Citizens'
use of the process to challenge U.S. enforcement policies and
practices may pick up. For example, issuance of the factual record
for the one submission involving the United States for which such a
record is currently being developed could conceivably contribute to a
change in perception and persuade U.S. NGOs that the process is
worth another look for its possible value to challenge U.S.
enforcement policies and practices.12 ' Further, shifts in domestic
politics, such as the 2008 U.S. presidential election, may influence
citizens' perceptions concerning the possible value of the process and
could engender increased NGO attention to the CEC mechanism.

118.

See, e.g., Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 42, at 307 (suggesting, in

reviewing the European Court of Justice and European Court of Human Rights,
that "the effectiveness of a supranational tribunal is enhanced where states
make its decisions legally binding"). Thus, Professors Helfer and Slaughter
would likely not characterize the CEC process as a truly effective form of
adjudication because of its inability to bind. However, they acknowledge that
variation in context may affect the transferability of the experience of different
models. See id. at 276.
119. See Knox, supra note 17, at 121 (suggesting that the CEC process has
the potential to succeed despite its lack of binding effect). For an interesting
recent review of a variety of mechanisms that incorporate different degrees of
cooperation and coercion, see, for example, Gunningham, supra note 2.
120. Currently, the Secretariat is in the process of creating a factual record
for one submission involving the United States. See CEC, Coal-Fired Power
Plants, supra note 93.
121.

The idea here is that citizens will perceive that the new administration

is more receptive to citizen complaints, which will motivate citizens to submit
complaints. On the other hand, there has been a loud citizen outcry about
perceived problems with U.S. domestic environmental enforcement over the
past eight years. See, e.g., ROBERT F. KENNEDY, JR., CRIMES AGAINST NATURE:
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But it is indisputable that, while use of the process to challenge
U.S. practices has never been particularly active, interest has
declined significantly in more recent years.122 The results from the
recent survey Professor Tom Tyler and I conducted represent
another set of data points that show this mechanism faces
significant challenges in winning public support from the
prospective submitter community.123 This Part identifies some likely
reasons for this disaffection and diminished use. At a minimum, if
the goal is to have a citizen submissions process that citizens want
to use and a process whose work product citizens would be willing to
accept, this track record and our findings suggest the value of
considering refinements and alternatives, at least as far as the
United States is concerned. I now turn to that challenge and a more
general exploration of citizen spotlighting processes.
III. REINVIGORATING THE CEC CITIZEN SUBMISSIONS PROCESS IN
PARTICULAR AND SOME MORE GENERAL OBSERVATIONS ABOUT
CITIZEN-LAUNCHED PROCESSES

I begin this Part with specific suggestions that I think could
significantly improve the procedural justice of the CEC citizen
submissions process and its attractiveness to citizens, at little cost
to the parties. I then step back to explore more generally the
promise of citizen-based "fire alarm" mechanisms, some of the more
important societal needs in the environmental arena, and how such
mechanisms might be reconfigured given this context.124
How

GEORGE BUSH AND His CORPORATE PALS ARE PLUNDERING THE COUNTRY AND
HIJACKING OUR DEMOCRACY (2004). Some citizens are likely to believe that the

new administration will do better and not require as much outside prodding.
Obviously, we will have to see how this turns out.
122. A number of political scientists have made the point that assessments
of the value of the citizen submissions process should not focus only on the use
of the process. Instead, they have suggested that the process is best viewed as
part of a multilayered process to mobilize public pressure for a particular issue.
See, e.g., Jeremy Wilson, The Commission for Environmental Cooperation and
North American Migratory Bird Conservation: The Potential of the NAAEC
Citizen Submission Procedure, 6 J. INT'L WILDLIFE L. & POL'Y 205, 227-29

(2003).
123. See Markell & Tyler, supra note 70, at 25-26 (highlighting desirable
procedural elements that could lead to increased use of the CEC procedure). As
we pointed out, our findings should be considered in light of the limitations of
our survey. Id. at 15-16. Further, there is support for the notion that lack of
familiarity reduces enthusiasm for an approach. Many of the respondents had
not used the process before and were not currently involved in a submission.
Id. at 18-19. As a result, the respondents' lack of familiarity with the CEC
process might have influenced our findings.
124. It is possible, and important, to consider the citizen submissions
process as it is situated in a variety of contexts. In this Article, I focus

primarily on the citizen-driven aspect of the process and its focus on
environmental concerns.
The "regional context" is obviously extremely
important as well but not dealt with directly in this Article. For an analysis of
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A. Specific Suggestions for Restoring Public Confidence in the CEC
Process
In the absence of empirical data, it is impossible to know with
certainty why the CEC citizen submissions process has failed to
trigger more use concerning U.S. enforcement of environmental
laws. For the reasons summarized in the preceding Part, my view is
that three likely suspects are the procedural-justice concerns
associated with the process, the practical issue of delays in
processing submissions, and the limited powers the process
possesses.125 It therefore seems logical to look for possible fixes in
these arenas.
I focus on the first two here because, in my view, they are the
easiest to effect and likely the most valuable.126 If there is a will,
there is an easy, straightforward way for the Council to address both
the procedural-justice and timeliness concerns in a way that would
resonate strongly with interested citizens. The Council could simply
use its power to issue resolutions, a power the Council has exercised
163 times to date, including forty resolutions that have focused on
the citizen submissions process (almost one-fourth of those

issued). 127

What would the Council need to include in such a resolution?
Two elements would be important. First, the Council should make
clear its intent to administer the process in a procedurally just way.
The Council routinely incorporates general statements of support for

the citizen submissions process in the regional context, see Michele M. Betsill,
Regional Governance of Global Climate Change: The North American
Commission for Environmental Cooperation,GLOBAL ENvTL. POL., May 2007, at

11.
125. See supraPart II.B.
126. While reconsideration of the "teeth" of the process is certainly
worthwhile as part of any reappraisal, it seems at least plausible that the
currently limited powers of the Secretariat are not the primary cause of the
diminution in interest, given the willingness of citizens to try the process in its
early years. See CEC, Four-Year Review, supra note 29, at 20 (noting that "the
fact that the process is not a complete judicial one does not, in our view, make it
either useless or ineffective"). Further, it seems unlikely that the parties will
renegotiate the Agreement any time soon to change the nature of the process in
a fundamental way that makes it more like a form of "supranational
adjudication." See Wold, supra note 6, at 249 (contending that "it is clear that
governments view the process as adversarial and litigation-based and are 'more
inclined to weaken the procedure rather than strengthen it'" (quoting Raustiala,
supra note 30, at 269)). As Professor Knox has observed, a managerial model is
likely to be much more palatable to states than an adjudication approach.
Knox, supra note 17, at 21.
http://www.cec.org/Page.asp?PagelD=1226
Resolutions,
127. CEC,
&ContentlD=&SiteNodelD=263&BLExpandID= (last visited Apr. 26, 2010).
The Council (and its constituent members) might want to supplement a
resolution with various other actions intended to signal a commitment to the
process.
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the process in resolutions involving the process,12 and it could easily
incorporate such a general statement in a new resolution. The
Council should also resolve to approve Secretariat recommendations
to prepare factual records and release such factual records absent
exceptional circumstances in order to reaffirm its intention to
administer the process in a procedurally just way."
Such a
resolution would need to be framed particularly carefully because of
the Council's reluctance to cede authority in an area that is within
its realm, notably the power to veto development of factual records
following a Secretariat recommendation. 130 But again, if there is a
will, there should be a way to get the semantics right to make this
happen. First, as a practical matter the Council would effectively be
committing to do what it does already-approve the Secretariat's
work in all but exceptional cases. To date, the Council has approved
the development of factual records in the vast majority of cases and
it has approved release of completed factual records for all fifteen
such records.'"' Second, at least one party, the United States, has
already unilaterally made such a commitment (via an executive
order),132 so the idea that a party would commit ex ante to approve
Secretariat recommendations is nothing new. 13 Third, the Council
can certainly frame the resolution so that the Council retains the
ability to reject a Secretariat document if needed, as the United
States has done.134 Indeed, the Council could make it clear that its
approach is a pilot project, thereby putting some pressure on the
Secretariat to act responsibly.
Professor Chris Wold has suggested that "the easiest way to
transform the citizen submission process would be to eliminate the

128. See,
e.g.,
CEC,
Council Resolution: 08-03,
CEC
Doc.
C/C.01/08/RES/03/Final (June 23, 2008), available at http://www.cec.org/Page
.asp?PageID=122&ContentID=941&SiteNodelD=265&BLExpandlD=.
129. The two decision points for the Council in the factual-record process are
determining whether to (1) approve a Secretariat recommendation to prepare a
factual record and (2) release a factual record. NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 15,
paras. 2, 7.
130. See id. para. 2; see also David L. Markell, Governance of International
Institutions: A Review of the North American Commission for Environmental
Cooperation's Citizen Submission Process, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 759,

765-66 (2005) (discussing the Council's veto power).
131. See CEC, Advice to Council, supra note 40 ("The Council has approved
16 of the 18 recommendations for factual records considered."); David McGovern
Letter, supra note 40 (noting that "[flifteen factual records have been prepared
and published").
132. Exec. Order No. 12,915, 3 C.F.R. 892 (1995), reprintedin 19 U.S.C.
§ 3472 (2006) (providing that "[t]o the greatest extent practicable,. . . where the
Secretariat ... informs the Council that a factual record is warranted, the
United States shall support the preparation of such factual record").
133. See Knox, supra note 17, at 90-91.
134. See id.
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governments' role in determining whether a factual record is
warranted.""' A Council resolution of the sort I recommend would
not go so far because it reserves this decision to the Council. The
resolution, however, would signal the Council's commitment to
increasing the "broader public interest" in the process."' Of course,
any benefit from such a resolution would be short-lived if the
Council did not implement it in a way that neutral observers would
consider to be fair and neutral. 3 7 If the Council were to issue such a
resolution, and if the Council implemented it in good faith, I believe
there is a reasonable chance such a resolution ultimately would help
bolster the procedural justice of the process.
To respond to concerns about delays, the Council should also
incorporate time frames for completing different stages of the
process in such a resolution. In its Advice to Council No: 08-01,
JPAC complained (again) that "[t]he procedure is too slow."''3 JPAC
noted that (1) it had previously recommended that the entire process
not take more than two years; (2) while delays in the preparation of
factual records because of Secretariat resource constraints might be
understandable, the Council's delays in performing its two
responsibilities (deciding whether to approve a recommendation for
a factual record and whether to publish a factual record when it is
finished) "are not"; and (3) delays "seriously undermine the
credibility and usefulness of the CEC.""9 JPAC requested "renewed
commitment by the Council" to adhere to timelines for completion of

the process.140
The increasing length of these delays makes it especially timely
for the Council to act to exercise control over a process for which it is
ultimately responsible. As Part II establishes, while the process has
proceeded painfully slowly for years and has been criticized for that
reason, these delays have recently worsened significantly.141
Further, the Council has specifically acknowledged delays in the
process as a concern and has committed itself to addressing them.

135. Wold, supra note 6, at 249.
136. David McGovern Letter, supra note 40.
137. Good-faith implementation would involve routine approval of the
development of factual records and their release, as well as a much more handsoff approach to the Secretariat's development of such records. The Council's
imposition of various conditions on the development of factual records has
triggered criticism by NGOs and others. See Markell, supra note 19, at 699707; Wold et al., supra note 26, at 425-30.
138. CEC, Advice to Council, supra note 40. Many others have raised this
concern as well. See, e.g., Garver,supra note 15, at 38 (characterizing delays as
the "most serious current threat" to the process); Wold, supra note 6, at 230
(noting that delays "obviously dampen public enthusiasm for the submission
process").
139.

CEC, Advice to Council, supra note 40.

140. Id.
141. See supra Part I.B.2.
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For example, in an August 2008 letter to JPAC on behalf of the
Council, Canadian Assistant Deputy Minister for International
Affairs David McGovern acknowledged "extended delays" in the
process.142 He indicated in this letter that the Council "look[s]
forward to discussions with JPAC and the Secretariat on how to
improve timeliness . .. in the [Submission on Enforcement Matters]

process."143
In short, delays are a highly visible but correctible problem that
the Council can act to address at little cost, and by doing so it can
earn credibility with the public. Although even the two years from
submission to factual record that JPAC recommends is a long time,
it would be an enormous improvement over the six-plus years the
CEC is currently on track to take to complete its work on open
files.'4 4 The parties have generally come reasonably close to meeting
their obligation to file responses to submissions within thirty days
(with an additional thirty days available under some
circumstances), so no adjustment is needed in this area.145 However,
the time it takes the Secretariat to draft factual records has
lengthened considerably in recent years, and the same is true for the
time it takes the Council to approve development and release of

factual records.146
Particularly as part of a resolution in which it commits to
accede to Secretariat recommendations to develop factual records in
most instances and to release factual records, the Council should
establish time limits for each stage. The Council would be lauded
for taking steps to expedite its own work. Further, the Council
could use the occasion to set deadlines for the Secretariat to develop
its recommendations and to prepare draft factual records, two other
stages of the process that take a long time. In my view, a Council
Council commits to approve
resolution in which the
recommendations and to release factual records except in
extraordinary circumstances and further commits to complete the
process in a much more timely fashion would, at relatively little cost
to the parties or Council, signal a commitment to the process that
would have the potential to rekindle citizen interest in using it.
Another relatively easy "fix" that would bolster public
confidence and the credibility of the parties (and Council) would be
for the Council to allow for, and indeed encourage, follow-up to
factual records. The lack of follow-up has long been a source of
frustration to citizens. JPAC expressed this frustration in its 2008

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.

David McGovern Letter, supra note 40.
Id.
See supra Part II.B.2.b.
See NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 14, para. 3.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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Advice:
The enforcement issues that have been highlighted through
factual records have not been followed up by the CEC, by
decision of the Council dated June 14, 2002. This has meant
that the CEC, after the release of factual records, has not been
able to:
a. engage those affected by a failure of a Party to
effectively enforce its environmental law to determine the
impact of preparation of a factual record on ongoing
enforcement,
b. ascertain any improvements in a Party's approach to
protecting and restoring the health and integrity of the
environment through improved enforcement of its
environmental laws; or
c. suggest improvements to the implementation of the
Article 14/15 process through analysis of that process in
specific situations involving the preparation and release of

a factual record.147

Follow-up of this sort is an essential part of competent
management and performance measurement.148 Further, allowing
and even encouraging such follow-up is consistent with President
Obama and Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Lisa
Jackson's commitment to transparency and accountability.149 The
Council has a wide array of options for conducting such follow-up
depending on its desire for control and concerns about costs. JPAC
has expressed its interest in and willingness to do such work,o the
CEC cooperative-work program could incorporate such work into its
program,1"' or the CEC Submissions on Enforcement Matters Unit
or its special legal advisors 5 2 could be directed to do so.
Alternatively, the governments could task their own officials with
developing follow-up reports at some reasonable point following

147.

CEC, Advice to Council, supra note 40.

148. Id. (indicating that it is a "basic precept" of governance to include
follow-up evaluations of performance).
149. See, e.g., Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, Jan.
21, 2009, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685 (Jan. 26, 2009) (explaining the benefits of a
transparent and accountable government); EPA Memo, supra note 5 (explaining

that the "EPA's actions must be transparent").

150. CEC, Advice to Council, supra note 40.
151. See Knox, supra note 17, at 119-20.

152. The CEC Secretariat has convened a group of distinguished experts to
serve as special legal advisors to the citizen submissions process. See CEC, Ten
Years, supra note 10, at 45. These advisors were extraordinarily generous with
their time during my tenure at the CEC and very helpfil.
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issuance of a factual record.'"' Regardless of the mechanism the
Council prefers, a Council resolution that endorses follow-up of the
sort JPAC describes is likely to make citizens more confident about
the value of the process and more willing to use it.
B.

More Far-ReachingOptions
Beyond these fixes for the CEC process in particular, the
experience of this process suggests it would be appropriate to
consider the design of citizen-spotlighting processes using the
following three lenses: (1) options for making such processes more
procedurally just, (2) the potential for citizen "fire alarm"
mechanisms to serve an integrative function in policy development
and implementation, and (3) the appropriate or "right" substantive
focus for such mechanisms. I discuss each in this concluding Part.
1. Taking a Harder and More Comprehensive Look at
Enhancing the Procedural Justice of Citizen Submissions
Processes
Professor Tom Tyler and I recently proposed a five-part
conceptual framework for evaluating processes that seek to promote
citizen participation."' Based on our tentative formulation, an ideal
(or relatively promising) procedure would be one (1) that people find
acceptable ex ante; (2) for which personal experience or familiarity
with the procedure bolsters rather than reduces its acceptability; (3)
for which a cross-section of relevant stakeholders agrees that the
procedure is an acceptable one; (4) with which people are satisfied
because of its fairness (its procedurally just character) rather than
because they are confident they would "prevail"; and (5) that does
well on "non-justice issues" rather than having such issues detract
from its acceptability.'
To elaborate briefly on the fourth element,
153. There seems to be room for such an approach per the August 2008
letter from Canadian Assistant Deputy Minister for International Affairs David
McGovern on behalf of the Council in which, at least implicitly, Minister
McGovern seems to leave open the possibility that parties might voluntarily
conduct such follow-up on their own, noting that "the NAAEC does not
contemplate any action by the Secretariat or the Council after the publication of
a factual record" and "any type of action by the Parties to follow up on factual
records is a matter of domestic policy as opposed to a requirement of the
NAAEC." See David McGovern Letter, supra note 40. While such an approach
arguably would be less appealing to citizens than an independent follow-up
mechanism, see Knox, supra note 17, at 28-36, it would almost certainly be
considered an improvement to the current system.
154. See Tom Tyler & David Markell, The Public Regulation of Land Use
Decisions: CriteriaForEvaluatingAlternative Procedures, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL

(forthcoming 2010), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm
?abstractid=1475378.
155. Id. (manuscript at 5). Procedural-justice theories contend that there
are distinct advantages to procedures that are accepted because of their
procedural qualities. Such procedures have a reservoir of support that gives
STUD.
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one typology theorists have suggested is that, in evaluating whether
procedures are fair, people consider the quality of decision making
(for example, the neutrality of the decision makers and the
opportunity to participate) and the quality of the treatment they
receive (for example, whether they are treated with courtesy and
respect).' 6
It would be worthwhile for policy makers to consider both
aspects of procedural justice in revisiting the structure of the CEC
process and in considering the structure of citizen-participation
processes more generally. For the CEC process, for example, it
seems noteworthy that an environmental NGO recently suggested
transforming the process into a nonadversarial, cooperative
mechanism with the hope that it will help transform a dysfunctional
process into one that contributes to addressing environmental
challenges."' Professor Chris Wold similarly has concluded that
"[t]he entire model is wrong" and that a better approach would
"facilitate[ I cooperation rather than encourage[ I an adversarial
process."" 8 These suggested changes relate to the procedurally just
character of the process and ways to make it more procedurally just
than it is now (or perceived to be). The Council, JPAC, and others
might consider options for enhancing the procedurally just quality of
the process beyond the suggested changes I offer above. For
example, it would be straightforward to incorporate into the process
the possibility of more cooperative interactions involving citizens,
These process options for
the Secretariat, and the parties.
enhancing the procedural justice of citizen-driven processes deserve
consideration outside of the CEC context as well. As noted above,
these types of ideas are very much part of the "new governance"
mantra that has won numerous adherents and that President
Obama embraced in his day-after-inauguration memorandum
urging use of different tools, methods, and systems to foster
cooperation. 159

their outcomes more credibility or legitimacy than procedures that are
acceptable because they are expected to produce desired outcomes. See id.
(manuscript at 13).
156. See id, (manuscript at 14).
157. See Wold, supra note 6, at 250.
158. Id.
159. See Memorandum on Transparency and Open Government, supra note
149.
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2. Envisioning and Designing Citizen Submissions
Mechanisms as "Outside-In" Tools to Promote IntegratedRather
than "Silo-Oriented" Government Responses to Significant
Challenges
A great deal has been written about the benefits of citizen
participation in governance and about the possible downsides.
Benefits include enhancing governance legitimacy by increasing
citizens' acceptance of government actions, improving the quality of
government decisions through more informed government decision
makers, and promoting more accountable government. 60 On the
other hand, citizen participation may slow government, divert it
from more important pursuits, and make government policy more
susceptible to capture by participating individuals and groups.'
The one aspect of citizen participation I highlight here is its
potential to facilitate more integrated and holistic approaches to
environmental protection and, indeed, to sustainable development
Performance-measurement experts and others
more generally.
sometimes refer to "silo" government structures to connote the
relatively unconnected and unintegrated governance infrastructure
that has evolved to address environmental and other challenges.' 6 2
If properly structured and focused, citizen submissions processes
have the potential to facilitate integrative efforts to address
sustainable-development
and
environmental
contemporary
challenges.16 3 This is particularly the case if such processes allow
and encourage citizens to pose the kinds of questions that facilitate
such efforts.
Canada's experience with its own citizen-petitions process is
illustrative. Canada's process, created in 1995, only a year after
creation of the CEC process, allows Canadian citizens to file
petitions in which they raise questions about whether particular
government policies and practices are consistent with sustainable

160. See David L. Markell, "Slack" in the Administrative State and Its
Implications for Governance: The Issue of Accountability, 84 OR. L. REV. 1, 10
(2005).
161. See id. at 4.
162. See, e.g., Colleen M. Flood et al., Steering and Rowing in Health Care:
The Devolution Option?, 30 QUEEN's L.J. 156, 176 (2004) (Can.) (discussing
funding "silos" in Canadian health care).
163. Professor Jonathan Wiener has used the phrase "radiative forcing" to
suggest that climate policy may "break the logjam in environmental law."
Jonathan B. Wiener, Radiative Forcing: Climate Policy to Break the Logjam in
EnvironmentalLaw, 17 N.Y.U. ENVrL. L.J. 210, 211 (2008). Professor Wiener is
referring to the need to revisit how our environmental-protection regime is
structured and he suggests that the enormous challenges of climate change may
drive fundamental changes in this structure to better equip us to respond. Id.
at 211-17.
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development.164 A 2007 review of the process found that citizen
petitions, by raising issues under the purview of multiple Canadian
government agencies, had prompted these agencies to work together
to address the issues raised.'6 ' The report indicated that one
petitioner stated that "petitions compel departments to talk to each
other about environmental issues-a significant benefit of the
petitions process."' 66 Similarly, government officials told the report's
authors that petitions "provide [ ] an opportunity for considering
interdepartmental positions" and "point out potential gaps in
policies and program delivery."'6 ' Thus, petitions helped to break
down the silos or facilitate coordination between and among
agencies.
The need to promote integrated and interdisciplinary thinking
about the major environmental and sustainable-development issues
we face, such as climate change, exists across North America (and
There are, of course, other ways to prompt such
beyond)."'
integrated thinking. For example, top-down approaches in which
leaders establish goals and structures may work to move us in this
direction. There is some evidence of attention to this issue at both
the federal and state levels. In appointing Carol Browner as the
Climate Change Czar, President Obama highlighted that it will be
important for her to break down bureaucratic barriers and work in
an integrated way.' 9 Similarly, California's 2008 law attempting to
integrate land-use and climate-change policies stems in part from
the insight that integrated approaches are needed. 0 These ongoing
efforts simply highlight the need for integration and coordination
regardless of how it occurs. In its 1998 report on the CEC, the
Independent Review Committee ("IRC") similarly observed that
each Party needs to "seriously address" the need for "coordination of
the multiple government agencies with an interest in the subject
matter of the NAAEC.""
In short, while the citizen-driven character of the CEC process

164. OFFICE OF THE AUDITOR GEN. OF CAN., REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
THE ENVIRONMENT AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT ch. 2, at 67-68 (2007),
available at http://www.oag-bvg.gc.ca/internet/docs/c20071002c-e.pdf.
165. Id. at 75.
166. Id. at 77.
167. Id. at 79.
168. See ENvTL. LAW INST., AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 6 (John
Dernbach ed., 2009); Delight Balducci et al., Green Jobs in New York: Where the
(Green) Economy Meets the (Green) Environment (Part1 of 2), ENVTL. L. N.Y.,

Mar. 2009, at 35; Wiener, supra note 163, at 219-23 (noting the need to develop
a multilayered, interconnected approach to address climate change).
169. See David L. Markell, Greening the Economy Sustainably, 1 WASH. &
LEE J. ENERGY CLIMATE & ENV'T (forthcoming 2010) (manuscript at 13),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=1376380.
170. Id. (manuscript at 2).
171. CEC, Four-YearReview, supra note 29, at 10.
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raises a host of issues for process designers, it strikes me that it
would be highly worthwhile for policy makers and others to carefully
consider the potential that such citizen-driven processes have to
engender more integrated ways of approaching environmental
challenges. This is an important possible benefit of citizen-driven
mechanisms-to provide an "outside-in" impetus to revisit
governance structures and approaches-that has received little
attention to date and deserves more.172
3. Reconsidering the Focus of the CEC Citizen Submissions
Process and Others, Including a Possible Shift to a Focus on a
"Sustainable-Development"Approach
A third important question concerning citizen-driven processes
involves their appropriate focus. In the context of revisiting regional
environmental agreements and the NAAEC in particular, it is
appropriate to reconsider the current focus of the CEC citizensubmissions process on domestic enforcement failures. For a variety
of reasons, it is worth considering shifting (and broadening) the
focus to encompass the sustainable-development character of
government decisions.
Commentators suggest that the concerns that motivated the
drafters to focus on domestic environmental
NAAEC's
enforcement-notably, concerns about "competitive effects" (for
example, a "race-to-the-bottom" triggered in part by inadequate
domestic enforcement)-have not materialized."' These findings
172. There clearly are potential downsides to such an approach that deserve
careful consideration as well. For example, as Professor Knox has noted,
"Professors Helfer and Slaughter point out that tribunals are more effective at
'policing modest deviations from a generally settled norm' than responding to
systemic problems requiring large-scale policy changes." Knox, supra note 17,
at 104 (quoting Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 42, at 330). Thus, policy makers
would be well advised to assess the challenges of citizen-driven processes that
provide opportunities for enhanced "integrative" thinking, as well as the
benefits of these processes.
173. See, e.g., Gaines, supra note 10, at 255. The concern during the
negotiations was that NAFTA would spawn a "race to the bottom" in which
Mexican underenforcement would spur manufacturing and other highly
regulated operations to move to Mexico because of the resulting lower cost of
doing business. See Wold, supra note 6, at 203. The hope was that the CEC
citizen submissions spotlight would help to ameliorate this concern. See Knox,
supra note 17, at 54 (suggesting that the NAAEC was created to help address
the Mexican "pollution haven" concern); see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: ASSESSMENT OF MAJOR ISSUES 11415 (1993), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d48tl3/149866.pdf (noting that the
NAFTA drafters attempted to provide adequate protection for the environment);
Kevin P. Gallagher, The CEC and Environmental Quality: Assessing the
Mexican Experience, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 16, at 117, 120-21

(finding that Mexico has not become a "pollution haven" post-NAFTA); Claudia
Schatan, The Environmental Impact of Mexican Manufacturing Exports Under
NAFTA, in GREENING NAFTA, supra note 16, at 133, 133.
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suggest the value of reassessing whether the CEC would be best
served by continuing to have the citizen submissions process focus
on enforcement issues (for example, whether enforcement-related
issues are the most pressing or of the greatest interest to citizens). 74
In short, if the goal is to have a process that focuses on some of the
most significant environmental challenges, it seems appropriate to
reconsider whether to confine the process to the enforcement
arena. 175
Beyond this apparent, empirically based reason for
reconsidering the focus of the citizen submissions process, a key
feature of the CEC is its focus on sustainable development and
environmental protection, transcending its roots as the product of
trade-agreement negotiations. Thus, the NAAEC articulates a goal
of promoting sustainable development that extends well beyond
addressing "regulatory effects" or trade and environment
connections more generally.176 In the first official review of the CEC,
conducted by the IRC, the IRC concluded that "the long-term value
of [the CEC] will be measured .. . by the contribution the CEC
makes to . . . sustainable development in North America.""

The

IRC reported that "the potential for the CEC to play an important
role in the achievement of sustainable development as the North
American economy becomes increasingly linked is widely recognized
This more general goal further supports
and supported.""'
reconsidering whether there are ways to revamp a key NAAEC
mechanism-the CEC process-to more closely align it with these
goals.
We are early on in understanding how best to reconfigure our
governance institutions to promote the unwieldy concept of
As suggested above, because of its
sustainable development.
potential for advancing integrative thinking, a citizen-driven process
such as the CEC citizen submissions process would seem to hold
potential for facilitating the interdisciplinary thinking that is
sustainable-development
more
towards
to move
needed
approaches-and to do so in a transparent environment that would
lead to greater accountability for program direction and

174. See Wold, supra note 6, at 234 (noting that "the empirical evidence does
not suggest" that enforcement is a "major worr [y]").
175. There are other reasons why confining the CEC process to this focus
may be ill-advised. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 838 (1985)
(declining to second-guess an agency enforcement decision because agency
enforcement decisions are inherently discretionary and there is no meaningful
basis for judicial review).
176. See NAAEC, supra note 6, pmbl., art. 1(b).
177.

CEC, Four-Year Review, supra note 29, at 5.

178. Id. at 9. The IRC notes that the purpose of the process "relates to
the. . . broader goal of sustainable development" by minimizing the risk of a
"race to the bottom." Id. at 20.
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performance.
In short, at least at a framework level, broadening the focus of
the CEC citizen submissions process has the potential to align the
process more closely with the most significant needs the CEC is
intended to address (and presumably this would be true for similar
processes in other agreements). It has the further potential to
prompt government officials to work in a coordinated way to
consider their responsibilities from a sustainable-development
perspective in a transparent environment, something that several
commentators have urged we pursue and yet a difficult challenge."'
While there clearly would be significant challenges to reconfiguring
the CEC and other processes operating in a similar context in this
way, it is, in my view, worth some attention as part of any initiative
to revisit the focus of such processes.
CONCLUSION

Despite high hopes and some positive feedback, the track record
of the CEC citizen submissions process raises several red flags
concerning its value as a model for "new governance" strategies that
rely upon increased citizen participation and enhanced government
transparency and accountability to advance public-policy goals.
While a skeptic about the process might feel vindicated by its track
record concerning the United States, the Council has power under
the NAAEC to exercise responsibility for the process in ways that
will address some of the more significant reasons for citizen
disaffection. 0 The Council thereby has the capacity to help the
process move in a more positive direction. While the Council's
rhetoric over the years has been virtually uniformly supportive of
the process, its responses to current challenges concerning the lack
of procedural justice that characterizes the operation of the process
and the extraordinary "slow and slower" pace of the process are
likely to reveal its true level of commitment. Thus, despite (and,
paradoxically, perhaps in part because of) the extant track record, I
believe the process has the potential to be a valuable complement to
domestic "new" and "traditional" governance mechanisms, if the
Council's real level of commitment matches its rhetoric.
The track record of the process also offers helpful insights for
the design of citizen "fire alarm" processes more generally. Process
designers would benefit from close attention to the types of pitfalls
the process has experienced and also from close attention to the
options for configuring such processes to take maximum advantage
of citizen engagement. While some of these issues are unique to the
free-trade sphere, others are worth considering more generally in

179. See, e.g., ENvTL. LAW INST., STUMBLING TowARDs
(John Dernbach ed., 2002).
180. See, e.g., NAAEC, supra note 6, art. 10.
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